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Over the next year another 50,000 people will become unemployed. The 
number of unemployed will surpass that of the last recession of 1997-98. 
To address the unemployment challenge New Zealand needs to supplement 
existing job search assistance with investment in training and business 
capital to push long term productivity growth. Subsidies to prop up jobs 
and firms should be avoided.
The April 2009 QSBO found that a net 36% of firms intend to cut staff 
numbers in the next three months. Unemployment will be the worst we 
have faced since the 1991 global recession. 
With the peak in unemployment approaching, attention needs to shift now 
to the challenge of getting the unemployed into work. The temptation 
will be to artificially protect jobs.  But this is short-sighted. The economic 
imperative should be to ensure New Zealand has the right human capital 
to prosper when the economy picks up. 
At  first  glance,  recent  initiatives  (temporary  top-up  support  for  those 
made redundant and the 9 day fortnight) appear sensible. But they have 
downsides and should be removed after the crisis has passed. 
Also, because they are tightly targeted they will have little impact, and do 
not cater well for many of the 50,000 or so extra unemployed. These will 
be new entrants to the labour market or those employed by small firms. 
This  policy  gap  needs  to  be  filled  to  avoid  high  and  long-term 
unemployment. 
Key points
Figure 1 Employment intentions and unemployment
Percent of labour force, seasonally adjusted (LH scale); Net percent of  
respondents, 4 quarter moving average (RH scale)
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Job subsidies should be avoided. They are a very expensive way of getting 
only  a  small  reduction  in  unemployment.  That  is  because  it  is  hard  to 
accurately work out which jobs are genuinely created, and which jobs 
would have been filled or created anyway. That means a huge potential 
for tax-payers’ money being wasted. Worse, job subsidies might prop up 
the ‘wrong’ jobs. That would undermine necessary structural change and 
long-term job and income growth.
The  most  cost-effective  of  initiatives  is  job  search  assistance.  Work  & 
Income  New  Zealand  has  a  well-honed  routine  of  getting  unemployed 
people into work before they even get to draw the unemployment benefit. 
This routine works well when there are job vacancies waiting to be filled. 
But right now it will not be enough because of a sheer lack of jobs.
Furthermore, there will be a mismatch between the skills and location of 
the unemployed and where job growth occurs. For example, there may 
not be the same amount of jobs in manufacturing or housing construction, 
or in the locations that people live now. Whatever the outcome, labour 
demand is unlikely to be the same as before the recession. 
Training programmes have potential to deliver long-term benefits. But they 
are expensive and should thus be targeted carefully. They should meet the 
specific needs of the individual and the local labour market.   
Training initiatives must also have in sight the longer-term objective of 
raising  productivity.  The  2009  OECD  review  calls  raising  productivity 
growth “the greatest medium-term challenge”. In our view investment in 
training needs to go hand-in-hand with promoting business investment if 
productivity growth is to be achieved. 
Reducing  the  cost  of  employment  must  be  another  area  for  attention, 
in  addition  to  addressing  skill  mismatches.  One  reason  unemployment 
persists is that wages and conditions do not adjust quickly enough to the 
new market environment. 
New Zealand’s employment relations policy scores high on international 
benchmarks. But there is scope for targeted changes to the Employment 
Relations Act, beyond the 90 day trial period for small firms. One idea is 
to remove the bias toward multi-employer collective agreements, as these 
create impediments to firms adjusting to local circumstances. 
Another way is to reduce the cost of employing labour. Areas that especially 
small employers raise as issues are the Holidays Act, health and safety 
legislation, and ACC levies.
All  in  all,  the  following  principles  should  guide  proposed  employment 
initiatives: 
•  use  the  opportunity  to  position  New  Zealand  to  benefit  from  the 
inevitable upturn
•  target  initiatives  to  raise  their  effectiveness  and  minimise  the 
negatives
•  don’t attempt to slow structural change. NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge 8 
Over the next year another 50,000 people will become unemployed. The 
number of unemployed will surpass that of the last recession of 1997-98. 
This comes after a decade of economic growth with unemployment hitting 
a low of 3.4% in 2007. 
Some  even  suggest  that  unemployment  may  reach  1991  levels  when 
unemployment peaked at 185,000 or 11%. We do not yet think it will get 
that bad – circumstances were vastly different: tight fiscal and monetary 
policy reinforced restructuring-induced unemployment in New Zealand on 
top of the effects of the 1991 global recession.
We  may  not  be  able  to  passively  rely  on  economic  growth  to  soak  up 
unemployment as quickly as it is now being created. This is because of 
two factors:
•  the outlook is for a long period of subdued growth after we come out 
of this recession
•  growth may come in sectors that require different skills and experiences 
than unemployed labour has. 
A  long  period  of  high  unemployment  and  high  levels  of  long-term 
unemployed  people  would  be  very  damaging,  both  for  the  individuals 
concerned and New Zealand’s longer term economic prospects.
An early policy change put in place a financial shock absorber for people 
made redundant – ‘ReStart’, a time-limited Unemployment Benefit top-up. 
The Job Summit generated interesting ideas, but most of these are yet to 
be turned into practical initiatives. As we near the unemployment peak, 
attention must shift to the challenge of getting the unemployed into work. 
So what are our options, and what works? 
The unemployment challenge
Figure 2 Unemployment numbers 
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A  look  around  the  world  shows  that  there  are  three  types  of  active 
employment policy1 targeted at the unemployed and other people not in 
work (Katz 1994): 
•  job creation 
•  training
•  job search assistance.
Most New Zealand research evidence on the effectiveness of such initiatives 
dates to the experience from the 1990s and tends to be consistent with 
international findings.
1   The jargon for these types of programmes is Active Labour Market Policies – “active” in the 
sense that they involve measures to move people into work, in contrast with “passive” income 
support.
Employment initiatives: what 
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Job creation
Job creation initiatives involve directly subsidising specific jobs in the private 
or public sectors. This is different from Government temporarily increasing 
its spending, for example on infrastructure, to indirectly stimulate general 
employment or avoid job losses.
Although job creation measures will appear to create jobs, the net job 
effect is usually small.  Calmfors (1994) describes three negative effects:
•  displacement  –  when  firms  that  benefit  from  the  wage  subsidies 
increase their production at the expense of firms with unsubsidised 
workers
•  substitution  –  when  firms  replace  unsubsidised  with  subsidised 
workers
•  deadweight losses –when firms employ subsidised workers who would 
have been employed anyway in the absence of the subsidy.
A range of evaluation studies of job creation programmes suggest that 
the negative effects are usually large. Maré’s 2005 survey of international 
studies  found  that  deadweight  effects  are  in  the  order  of  60  percent, 
substitution  effects  of  around  25  percent  and  displacement  effects  of 
around  5  percent  of  jobs  ‘created’.  That  is,  for  every  20  jobs  that  are 
‘created’  after  the  subsidy  is  in  place,  twelve  would  have  happened 
anyway, five are just replacing unsubsidised workers, and one is due to 
displacement. Only two are genuinely “new” jobs. 
However, job subsidies can reduce the number of weeks of assistance or 
contact that jobseekers subsequently have with the employment service. 
But these favourable impacts are not evident until at least a year after the 
subsidy starts (Maré 2002). These interventions also appear to be more 
effective for males than for females and, to a lesser extent, more effective 
for younger than for older jobseekers. 
Overall, given their problems, it is difficult to see these types of direct 
subsidy programmes truly offering value for money, given they do not lead 
to many additional jobs.2 
The Job Support Scheme acts in a less direct way. It provides government 
subsidies for employees who agree to reduce work hours to a nine-day 
fortnight, as an alternative to redundancies. On the face of it, this is one of 
the employment initiatives that should be avoided. It risks giving support 
to marginal firms in declining industries.
But  a  number  of  features  of  the  scheme  mitigate  the  worst  potential 
effects.    Cost-sharing  between  firms,  employees  and  the  government, 
should reduce the behaviours that result in deadweight, substitution and 
displacement effects.  This is reinforced by the fact that it is time-limited 
for a maximum of six months. It is also limited to firms with more than 50 
2  They act to share the burden of unemployment. This may reduce the number of people 
who become long-term unemployed, but is it an efficient and equitable way to do so?11  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
employees, which represent a little over half of total employment.3
In practice, the effect of the Job Support Scheme may be to smooth the 
adjustment  process  of  downsizing.    Even  in  a  recession  there  is  staff 
turnover, and the support will facilitate downsizing through attrition rather 
than rapid job loss through redundancies. The scheme therefore has some 
merit,  but  is  unlikely  to  have  any  noticeable  impact  on  economy-wide 
unemployment.
Training programmes
Training  and  retraining  programmes  can  directly  address  missing  or 
obsolete  human  capital,  and  provide  structure  and  routine  to  mitigate 
some of the lifestyle effects of unemployment. 
The  types  of  training  can  range  from  basic  literacy  and  numeracy  to 
vocational  courses,  but  also  “life  skills”  (including  drug  and  alcohol 
rehabilitation) and support for self-employment.
The  evidence  of  the  effect  of  training  on  solving  unemployment  is 
mixed. Training can have negative effects for the first one or two years if 
participants are kept away from the labour market for the duration of the 
training. However, this lock-in effect may be offset by large positive impact 
in the long run (OECD, 2005).
New  Zealand  experience  also  shows  benefits  from  capacity-building 
programmes – training, confidence building, and work experience (Johri 
et al, 2004). The lock-in effect tends to reduce participants’ short-term 
chances to find work, but the experience is that, when combined with wage 
subsidies, the impact on the chance of finding employment was better.
Training programmes tend to benefit adult women, have mixed effects for 
men, and have no benefit for out-of-school youths. The latter group must 
be a target of any employment interventions given the linkages between 
recessions, youth unemployment and the ‘one-way trap door’ into crime 
and poverty.
Training  programmes  are  probably  more  effective  than  job  creation 
schemes (Calmfors, 1994), but their effectiveness is patchy, and training is 
among the most expensive of measures (Martin and Grubb, 2001). So this 
intervention should be used carefully.
Job search assistance
Job search assistance takes several forms, including initial interviews and 
job search seminars at the employment service, job-matching services, 
in-depth counselling, and re-employment bonuses.
Job  search  assistance  does  not  directly  reduce  unemployment.    The 
number of people seeking work, and their success at finding it, is primarily 
a  function  of  the  economy-wide  demand  for  labour.    But  job  search 
3  56 percent of the employee count in March 2008, according to the Statistics New Zealand 
Longitudinal Business Frame.NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge 12 
assistance does reduce the duration of unemployment, which may in turn 
reduce the number of unemployed people at any given point in time.  
New Zealand experience shows that the programme with the highest impact 
at one and at three years, if measured as becoming independent of Work 
& Income assistance, is helping job seekers into self-employment (Johri et 
al, 2004). But participants in these type of programmes are probably more 
motivated than others. 
Job search assistance seems the most effective and least expensive of 
interventions, according to most of the evidence. To be successful, it must 
be combined with monitoring of the job search behaviour and enforcement 
of work tests. In New Zealand it is already at the core of all programmes 
of employment assistance.
No silver bullet: customised pack-
ages are best
Pulling it all together, the evidence shows that there is no silver bullet. 
No matter how good their intention, all interventions can have negative 
effects. But this especially true for wage subsidies. 
A  package  of  measures  may  be  the  best  way  forward.    Well-targeted 
design and delivery can reduce many of the negatives of all three types of 
intervention (Chapple, 1999). That is of course more easily said than done. 
A targeted package would fit around the circumstances of individual job 
seekers and the local labour market – training in forestry is unlikely to be 
a good option for urban unemployed. 
Job search assistance is usually most effective for people with short durations 
of unemployment who are work-ready. Training or other interventions can 
help where unemployment duration is already lengthening and there are 
barriers to employment, such as poor skills or health. Training might then 
be reinforced by focused job search assistance on completion.
At this juncture in New Zealand, an emphasis on training seems warranted. 
Unemployment is usually most concentrated among people with limited 
human  capital.  But  this  time  around,  even  skilled  people  may  need 
assistance, if they have specialist skills that are ill-suited to those that are 
going to be in demand in the recovery.
For example, there may not be the same amount of jobs in manufacturing 
or housing construction, or in the locations that people live now. It is as 
yet unclear whether the same amount of job growth can be expected in 
residential construction and finance, for example. And manufacturing jobs 
had been contracting regardless. Whatever the outcome, labour demand 
growth  is  unlikely  to  be  in  the  same  sectors  and  places  as  before  the 
recession.
Furthermore,  research  on  the  productivity  challenge  suggest  training 
cannot be the only story: it needs to go hand-in-hand with a deepening 
of physical capital if New Zealand’s long-term economic performance is to 
improve (Treasury, 2008; Hall and Scobie, 2005). 13  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
Job creation projects should be avoided.  At best they are a very expensive 
way of getting a small reduction in unemployment, and their main effect is 
in reshuffling unemployment.  At worst, they may undermine long-term job 
growth by propping up employment in declining sectors. This may seem 
politically attractive in the short-term. But it undermines any necessary 
structural changes and thus the prospects of industries with strong growth 
potential.  
The main questions in picking the best mix of interventions are thus how 
long the downturn might last and how can we best identify the specific 
training needs of individuals.  The latter is a specialist task, and a short-
term boost to skilled case managers in Work & Income New Zealand may 
be a good investment for the tax-payer and the economy.
If the downturn is relatively short, an emphasis on job search assistance, 
reinforced by short-term training for targeted unemployed people, would 
be an appropriate mix.  But if the downturn and the resulting increase in 
unemployment proves to be longer lasting, a larger share of training of all 
forms would be required.
Regardless, employment policies will deliver only modest improvements 
while the labour market is in a slump. The timing of the interventions is 
important “with all interventions being less effective when employment 
growth is small” (Maré, 2002). In other words, pushing water uphill makes 
for hard work right now, but it could pay to open the floodgates when 
economic conditions start to improve.
Figure 3 Job growth by industry 2003-2008
Change in annual average number of jobs in the years to December
Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Other policies must play their part 
too
The labour market does not function in isolation from other markets.  No 
policies can deliver job growth when output growth is stagnant. Sound 
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies are essential. 
Policies need to support entrepreneurship and business growth to lead 
to increased job opportunities. They also need to support and encourage 
people to attain the right skills, adapt to changes in the market, and offer 
their labour.
Currently New Zealand is ranked 22 out of 30 in the OECD productivity 
league table – an hour worked here generates 30% less output than an 
hour worked in Australia. This seems to be due to a combination of:
•  a low capital intensity, as New Zealand’s capital to labour ratio is less 
than two-thirds of that of Australia by one measure (Treasury, 2008)
•  poor  performance  on  technological  diffusion,  or  the  efficiency  in 
combining capital and labour (OECD, 2009).
Both seem to be best explained by New Zealand’s small size and distance 
to markets. It is telling that the share of business to total investment has 
been consistently below the OECD median for decades, with investment 
concentrated  in  residential  property.  That  type  of  investment  does  not 
make the boat go faster. 
One of the things New Zealand must do to compensate for its natural 
disadvantages is to have a super-efficient business regulatory environment, 
to raise the rewards to investment, and reduce the premium on the cost 
of capital. 15  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
The welfare safety net 
Putting aside the quality of the wider regulatory environment, employment 
interventions cannot be expected to succeed when other labour market 
and social insurance policies heap costs on employers hiring and firing 
labour, or weaken work incentives.
Income  support,  such  as  through  unemployment  benefits,  provides  a 
safety net against the social and economic impacts of job losses. Working 
for Families and other tax credits give a buffer against a fall in income 
when still in employment.
At the same time as insulating households from the worst of income losses, 
this safety net also supports consumption (one of the so-called ‘automatic 
stabilisers’).  
The level of income support has to be pitched right. It should provide 
sufficient  protection  against  income  shocks  –  without  absolving 
households’ responsibilities to protect themselves, if they can, in the form 
of precautionary savings. The optimal level may well need to be different in 
a protracted recession if time between jobs becomes considerably longer 
than normal. 
The recently introduced ReStart does exactly that by temporarily providing 
extra income support over the standard unemployment benefit for those 
who have recently been made redundant. But it will need close monitoring 
as overseas evidence shows that time-limited support may actually extend 
the spell of unemployment, by reducing incentives for people to take early 
job offers. Policy-makers should also consider the need to withdraw the 
policy (and signal this policy change in advance) when the economy pulls 
out of the recession. Offering this extra ‘free’ insurance is bound to lead 
to households winding down taking their own precautions – a so-called 
moral hazard.
The floor on income support should protect people against poverty. But if 
income support is too generous compared to expected income from labour 
it will discourage people from taking on jobs. 
Another setting to get right is abatement – the claw-back of the tax credit 
or  income  support  against  additional  incomes.  When  this  claw-back  is 
combined with the ordinary tax on income the effective marginal tax rate 
can be very high. Rates of over 50% and even exceeding 100% are not 
unknown.
Such high rates will discourage people to take up work or increase their 
hours.  The  evidence  suggests  this  is  especially  an  issue  for  secondary 
earners and sole parents.  
Designing  tax  and  benefits  systems  with  “suitable”  abatement  regimes 
is one of the most intractable policy tasks internationally. New Zealand 
deals with this through a complex morass of top-ups and tax credits, even 
drawing in households on relatively high incomes. But this solution imposes 
a higher than necessary tax burden on employment, and as such is not 
pro-growth. It requires a close re-examination.NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge 16 
Employment relations 
A flexible labour market is important, especially to allow the necessary 
structural adjustments to occur. Labour and capital resources need to be 
able to flow to new ventures and sectors, out of the marginal firms and 
industries that were propped up by strong demand that was fuelled by 
easy credit. The quicker the better.
A regulatory environment that promotes investment into skills and capital 
is one part of the creative destruction story. The other part has to be an 
enabling industrial relations framework. 
New Zealand’s industrial relations framework is reasonably flexible, ranking 
14/181 in the World Bank’s Ease of Employing Workers indicator in its 2009 
Doing Business index.
New  Zealand  ranks  behind  Australia  (8th)  and  the  United  States  and 
Singapore  (1st  equal)  on  the  employment  indicator.  That  reflects  the 
relatively high ratio of minimum wage to average value added per worker, 
rather than market rigidities. On the Firing Costs subindex, New Zealand 
ranks 1st equal with the US. 1
So  a  major  revamp  of  the  employment  law  is  probably  not  needed  to 
speed up the structural adjustment. But there may be gains in targeted 
modifications to the current law to address specific problems. A recent 
example is the 90 day trial period for new employees in small firms that 
promotes  more  risk-taking  in  hiring  decisions,  by  reducing  costs  if  the 
relationship does not work out. This could be expanded to larger firms, 
for example.
Another area ripe for review is the bias in law for multi-employer collective 
agreements  (MECAs).  MECAs  make  the  labour  market  more  rigid.  It  is 
obvious that blanket conditions in collective agreements are a barrier to 
employers and employees finding solutions that suit local conditions – a 
clear  rationale  for  enterprise  based  bargaining.  Past  and  recent  sector 
stoppage data for the health and education sectors suggest MECAs may be 
associated with poorer, rather than better, employment relations. 
Similarly, there is scope to review other regulation that raise the cost of 
doing business and especially those that raise the cost of employment, 
such as the Holidays Act, health and safety legislation, and ACC levies. This 
is particularly important for smaller firms (Business NZ-KPMG 2008)
Minimum wage
Minimum wages raise the costs of and thus reduce employment at the 
lower end of the labour market. They encourage firms to replace low-wage 
jobs with capital or higher skilled labour. But they also encourage more 
people to participate in the workforce. 
Another school of thought is that minimum wages raise productivity by 
‘forcing’ employers to invest in strategies and training to offset increased 
1  New Zealand was ranked 4th lowest on Employment Protection Legislation among the 28 
member nations of the OECD in 2003 (OECD, 2004).17  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
wage costs. Some of this logic seems odd (why not raise productivity 
anyway?) and the evidence points to low waged workers receiving little 
on-the-job training compared to other staff.
The empirical evidence on the minimum wage is not conclusive. Both small 
negative and small positive employment effects have been reported. When 
Hyslop and Stillman (2004) analysed the effects of raising the minimum 
wage for youth workers in New Zealand from 2001 they found:
•  no robust evidence of adverse effects on youth employment or hours 
worked
•  stronger evidence of positive employment responses to the changes 
•  significant increases in income of teenagers relative to young adults
•  inconclusive  evidence  of  fewer  educational  enrolments  and  higher 
unemployment.
The minimum wage impacts are most pronounced at the bottom end of the 
labour market among those most at risk of unemployment (Department of 
Labour, 2007). 
This inconclusive evidence does not make a strong case for either raising 
or lowering the minimum wage. But in a market where margins are being 
squeezed, risks are clearly on the downside. Employers are more likely to 
respond to increases in the minimum wage by reducing employment than 
by investing in training to raise productivity. A policy stance of aggressively 
raising the minimum wage is thus not to be recommended at this stage of 
the economic cycle.NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge 18 
A key objective must be to position New Zealand on a strong growth path 
once the inevitable upturn starts.1  The  2009  OECD  review  calls  raising 
productivity growth “the  greatest medium-term challenge”. We think that 
any employment initiative now should be aligned to that objective. 
Our review shows that a mix of employment programmes will be required, 
with solutions customised around the needs of individuals and local labour 
markets.  
At first glance the recent employment initiatives (temporary top-up support 
for those made redundant and the 9 day fortnight) might appear sensible. 
But the potential for deadweight losses and moral hazard mean that they 
should be removed after the crisis has passed. Also, because they are 
tightly targeted, they will have little impact, and will not capture many of 
the 50,000 or so extra unemployed who will be new entrants to the labour 
market or employed by small and medium sized firms. 
We find that job search assistance has to be central to the mix. This is 
very cost-effective at the early stages of unemployment – it can even avoid 
people going on the unemployment benefit.  
But it will need to be reinforced by training where there are barriers to 
employment, such as poor skills. Training programmes have the potential 
to deliver long-term benefits, if they help speed up structural mismatches 
between existing skills and those that will be demanded once the economy 
picks up again.  The 9 day fortnight policy missed the opportunity to link 
support to training.
1  A forthcoming NZIER public discussion paper will examine New Zealand’s challenge in more 
detail.  
Lessons for the unemployment 
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Training  is  expensive  and  should  thus  be  targeted  carefully.  It  should 
meet the specific needs of the individual and the local labour market. It 
must also have in mind the longer game of developing a skilled, adaptable 
workforce aimed at raising productivity. And any training initiative needs 
to  go  hand-in-hand  with  promoting  business  investment  if  productivity 
growth is to be achieved. 
One reason unemployment persists is that wages and conditions do not 
adjust quickly enough to the new market environment. So reducing the 
cost of employment must be another area for attention, in addition to 
addressing skill mismatches.
As such, a flexible labour market is of critical importance. New Zealand’s 
industrial relations policy still scores high on international benchmarks. 
But there is scope for targeted changes to the Employment Relations Act, 
beyond the 90 day trial period for small firms, such as extending it to all 
firms, and removing the bias toward MECAs. MECAs create impediments to 
firms adjusting to local circumstances. 
Reducing the cost of employing labour would assist too. Policy changes 
that would reduce employment related compliance costs include the ACC 
employer levy, the Holidays Act, and health and safety legislation – all 
areas  frequently  mentioned  by  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  in 
particular.
Employment interventions should not undermine the process of structural 
adjustment. Creative destruction is an uncomfortable but necessary fact. 
Job subsidies should therefore be avoided, or at best regarded as a last 
resort option.  At best these job creation schemes are a very expensive 
way  of  getting  a  small  reduction  in  unemployment;  at  worst  they  may 
undermine  long-term  job  growth  by  undermining  necessary  structural 
change.
All  in  all,  the  following  principles  should  guide  proposed  employment 
initiatives: 
•  use  the  opportunity  to  position  New  Zealand  to  benefit  from  the 
inevitable upturn
•  target and customise to raise effectiveness and minimise the negative 
effects
•  don’t attempt to slow structural change. NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge 20 
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Who is unemployed?
Unemployment tends to be concentrated among groups with lowest human 
capital, and hence lower productivity in the workplace.  
In the year to December 2008, the unemployment rate averaged 4.1 percent 
across the labour force as a whole.  
But significantly higher unemployment was found among:
•  people  with  no  qualifications,  or  no  more  than  secondary 
qualifications
•  young people – those under 30, and especially those under 20
•  people of any ethnicity other than European.
The  links  between  human  capital  and  lower  qualifications,  and  human 
capital and younger ages (limited work-related experience), are obvious.   
The link between unemployment and ethnicity is less obvious, but much 
can be explained by:
•  the  relative  youth  and  lower  qualifications  of  Maori  and  Pacific 
Peoples
•  unfamiliarity with the local labour market and culture by, and lack of 
English language proficiency of, recent immigrants.1
While the common measure of unemployment is not the same as people 
on the dole (see Figure 2), and is in fact much higher than that, at the 
same time it understates the number of people who might be employed 
in a stronger labour market.  This is because “unemployment” relates to 
people who are not in paid employment and are actively taking steps to 
seek work.  
A broader definition of joblessness refers to all persons who are without 
a job but want one.  This is approximately double the number of official 
unemployed. 
1  Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) show that immigrants’ initial labour market outcomes 
were generally below those of similar New Zealand-born people.  However, with more time 
in the country, migrants can expect their labour market disadvantage to decrease and even 
disappear.
Looking at unemployment23  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
Figure 4 Unemployment by highest qualification
Percent of the labour force:  year ended December 2008
Source: Statistics New Zealand
Figure 5 Unemployment by age group
Percent of the labour force:  year ended December 2008
Source: Statistics New Zealand
Figure 6 Unemployment by single/combined ethnicity
Percent of the labour force:  year ended December 2008
Notes: NEI=not elsewhere indicated, MELAA=Middle Eastern/ Latin American/African 
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The dynamics of unemployment
During the strong labour market of the current decade the participation 
rate – the share of persons of working age either employed or seeking 
work – has increased to record levels, through a combination of relatively 
stable  male  participation  rates,  and  female  participation  rates  on  an 
upward trend.
There is no sign of participation rates falling yet – in fact, female participation 
was increasing throughout 2008.  But a weaker labour market will lead to 
large number of people remaining outside the labour market, or leaving it 
for example, students, or people with family responsibilities.
Focusing  purely  on  unemployment  figures  and  trends  overlooks  the 
dynamics  of  the  labour  market,  with  a  continual  movement  of  people 
between employment, unemployment and non labour market activity, as 
well as changing jobs. 
Table  2  shows  average  transition  probabilities  -  i.e.  the  likelihood  that 
people in any given labour force status will be in the same or a different 
status between one quarter and the next, during the year to March 2008.
In that period, which was when unemployment at a low point, 95 percent 
of people employed in one quarter were still employed in the following 
quarter  (although  not  necessarily  in  the  same  job),  and  89  percent  of 
people not in the labour force remained outside it a quarter later. Also:
•  only  1  percent  of  employed  people  were  unemployed  a  quarter 
later – five times as many leaving employment left the labour force 
altogether
•  most people initially outside the labour force found work when they 
sought it
•  24 percent of people who were unemployed in any quarter were still 
unemployed three months later. 
These  numbers  were  recorded  during  a  very  strong  labour  market, 
so  may  not  be  representative  of  what  we  can  expect  during  a  weaker 
one.  Transition probabilities for people employed and not in the labour 
force  tend  to  be  relatively  stable.  But  this  picture  is  different  for  the 
unemployed.  In the early 1990s – the tail end of the highest post-War level 
of unemployment – unemployed people had a roughly 50 percent chance 
of remaining unemployed over successive quarters.  25  NZIER public discussion document 2009/2 | The unemployment challenge
Source:  Statistics New Zealand
Table 1  Joblessness
000s of persons; December 2008 quarter
Official unemployed  99.4
Available for but not actively seeking work: 
    Seeking through newspaper only  9.2
    Discouraged  3.2
    Other  58.0
Actively seeking but not available for work   27.4
Total jobless people  197.3
Figure 7 Labour force participation rates
Percent of the working age population:  moving annual average
Source: Statistics New Zealand
Notes:  (1) Average, four quarters to March 2008 
  (2) Not LF = Not in the Labour Force
Source:  Statistics New Zealand
Table 2  Labour force transition probabilities 2007/08
Proportion of persons in labour force states over two successive quarters
Employed Not in LF Unemployed
Employed 0.95 0.08 0.4
Not in LF 0.05 0.89 0.36
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Duration of unemployment
The fact that in recent times, most unemployed people have moved into 
jobs, or out of the labour force, means that most people are not unemployed 
for long periods.  This is confirmed when we look at the duration of spells 
of unemployment.
Short duration unemployment - four weeks or less – represents people 
who are between jobs.  It is sometimes known as frictional unemployment.   
This has been relatively stable (relative to total employment) for most of 
the last two decades.  However it has been increasing over the last year, 
which is likely a precursor to longer spells of unemployment.
Long duration unemployment – over 26 weeks – increased markedly during 
the recessions of the early and late 1990s, and proved slow to recover.   
The tail of long duration unemployment from the 1990s only declined after 
sustained job growth in the current decade.
This type of unemployment represents the greatest potential problem, as 
people with long spells of unemployment find it difficult to move back into 
work, even when jobs are plentiful.  There are a number of reasons.
Budd et al (1988) refer to the combination of “a reduction in the intensity 
of job search and … a  reluctance of employers to hire the long-term 
unemployed”. The latter is a signalling effect – employers tend not to offer 
jobs to apparently suitable long-term unemployed people, as they take 
long duration as suggesting some unobserved negative characteristic.
The  only  substantial  New  Zealand  research  on  this  issue  is  a  survey 
undertaken in the late 1990s (Parker, 1997).  This showed that very long-
term  job  seekers  (continuously  registered  with  the  then  New  Zealand 
Employment Service for over 52 weeks) faced four common and important 
barriers to securing work: 
•  limited  mobility  –  typically  rural  Māori  without  a  driving  license 
and/or  lacking  access  to  car  or  public  transport.    But  31  percent 
indicated a willingness to move to a new town or city to take up a job 
opportunity
•  perceived age discrimination – both among people aged under 20 and 
over 40 years of age
•  lack of educational qualifications (including weaknesses in literacy and 
mathematics) – especially among Māori and Pacific Islanders
•  poor English language skills - among Pacific Islanders and people of 
other ethnicities.
Other barriers identified included: lack of qualifications; lack of appropriate 
skills or work experience; lack of available or appropriate jobs in the local 
area; and health, disability, or physical incapacity.
In addition, long-duration unemployment may lead to lifestyle effects.  As 
people become disengaged from work and the associated routines and 
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the point that they constitute barriers to re-employment – e.g. loss of work 
habits, increased drug and alcohol consumption, social disengagement,2 
health problems.
The combination of these factors can mean that long-duration unemployed 
people move to the back of the queue for job vacancies – behind people 
already in employment, with short histories of unemployment and entering 
the labour force. 
Intermediate  duration  unemployment  represents  the  at-risk  group  – 
unemployed people who have not quickly found jobs, and are at risk of 
remaining unemployed for long periods. 
The above issues occur independently of the circumstances under which 
individuals become unemployed.  Additional concerns are generated when 
the cause of unemployment is structural change, i.e. a decline in some 
industries and expansion in others.  
Typically,  the  normal  dynamics  of  the  labour  market  can  accommodate 
structural  change,  though  people  changing  jobs,  entering  and  leaving 
the labour force, allied with in-firm training processes.  This adjustment 
generally passes unnoticed when declines are gradual with job loss through 
attrition.  It is more problematic when job loss is through redundancies in 
a softening labour market.  
For example, Fletcher (1995) and Humphris and Chapple (2002) point to 
the decline in manufacturing and reduced demand for workers with low or 
no educational qualifications, and for production and related workers, as 
causes of the decline in participation and employment rates among Pacific 
peoples.
2  Informal contacts and word of mouth are an important source of job opportunities.
Figure 8 Duration of unemployment
Number of persons (excluding no duration specified)
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1-4 weeks 5-8 weeks
9-13 weeks 14-26 weeks
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Implications
Given that unemployment tends to be concentrated among people with 
low human capital, this means that the bulk of the costs of the recession 
will fall disproportionately on relatively small number of people.
Even if the effect is that people are unemployed for longer than would 
be  the  case  in  a  strong  labour  market,  these  costs  are  not  trivial.   
Unemployment almost invariably results in a loss of income, which the 
unemployment benefit can only partially compensate for, and extended 
spells  of  unemployment  can  have  pronounced  lifestyle  effects,  loss  of 
savings etc.
The risk of any period of prolonged unemployment is that people drop out 
of labour market, or become long-duration unemployed.  This means that 
it can become very difficult to get them into work again, even when job 
growth resumes.  Personal consequences of being unemployed become 
barriers to re-employment (i.e. self-reinforcing cycles).  Such people wind 
up at the back of the queue for jobs, behind people already in work, recent 
unemployed, and new entrants to the labour market.
There are the obvious costs to the people themselves.  But there also are 
costs to society through  social and fiscal costs arising from effects of 
unemployment, such as healthcare, crime, drugs,3 and potential output 
losses when employment growth resumes, if long duration unemployed 
people cannot be re-integrated into the labour market – i.e. the possibility 
that there are unfilled jobs side-by-side with a pool of unemployment.
This  points  to  a  very  strong  argument  to  minimise  long-duration 
unemployment within the total pool of unemployment.
3  Although it is difficult to estimate what proportion of these costs can be attributed to 
higher unemployment, and what proportion would have occurred regardless.8 Halswell St, Thorndon | PO Box 3479, Wellington 
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